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We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in
1789. We document patterns in the evolution and pro￿le of political dynasties, study
the self-perpetuation of political elites, and analyze the connection between political
dynasties and political competition. We ￿nd that the percentage of dynastic legisla-
tors is decreasing over time and that dynastic legislators have been signi￿cantly more
prevalent in the South, the Senate and the Democratic party. While regional and party
di⁄erences have largely disappeared over time, the di⁄erence across chambers has not.
We document di⁄erences and similarities in the pro￿le and political careers of dynastic
politicians relative to the rest of legislators. We also ￿nd that legislators that enjoy
longer tenures are signi￿cantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later.
Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a
longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a
political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a
positive exogenous shock to a person￿ s political power has persistent e⁄ects through
posterior dynastic attainment. Finally, we ￿nd that increases in political competition
are associated with fewer dynastic legislators, suggesting that dynastic politicians may
be less valued by voters.
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11 Introduction
A recent article in The Economist complained that the last two presidential elections in
the United States have been dominated by descendants of former presidents or Senators.
President Bush is the son of a president and grandson of a Senator, Mr. Gore is the son of
a Senator and the exception is John Kerry, who, according to the article, is ￿thanks to a
rich wife, the richest Senator in a Senate full of plutocrats.￿ 1 Political dynasties are present
in other democracies as well, such as India, where the Gandhi dynasty has spanned three
generations and four di⁄erent national leaders. The main concern over political dynasties is
that inequality in the distribution of political power may re￿ ect imperfections in democratic
representation.2 However, the classic elite theorists Pareto, Mosca, and Michels held that
the domination of large societies by small elites is inevitable (see Michels 1962 [1915] Ch.
6.2, and Putnam, 1976). According to Michels (1962 [1915]), even under democracy, forces
operate that necessarily lead to oligarchy. Furthermore, Mosca thought that the rule of
elites is bene￿cial. The concentration of political power may simply re￿ ect inequality in the
distribution of abilities.
We begin by documenting the evolution of political dynasties in the Congress of the
United States by using biographical data on legislators for the period 1789 to 1996. We ￿nd
that the percentage of dynastic politicians among legislators has signi￿cantly decreased over
time. (A ￿dynastic￿legislator is one who belongs to a family that has placed a member in
Congress before). Dynastic legislators have been signi￿cantly more prevalent in the South
and in the Senate, consistent with the notion of the South displaying lower social mobility
and openness, and the notion of the Senate as a more exclusive body. However, the regional
di⁄erence has disappeared after World War II while the di⁄erence across chambers remains.
We also show that political dynasties have been signi￿cantly more prevalent in the Demo-
cratic party in the ￿rst hundred years of congressional life, but not afterwards. We also
1See The Economist article ￿Meritocracy in America: Ever higher society, ever harder to ascend,￿De-
cember 29th 2004.
2Conventional wisdom considers that access to resources, key people, or name recognition￿ rather than
merit￿ boost the chances of a particular person to attain political power. For instance, a Time South Paci￿c
article (￿Rallying the masses￿ ; 09/13/99) reported on why members of the National Congress party thought
Sonia Gandhi was a good candidate: ￿The Congress Party thinks the Gandhi name is a vote winner.￿In
a similar vein, an article in The Economist (￿Sonia, of course￿ ; 11/18/2000) noted that ￿The party has
better politicians than she but none with her star quality (more an emanation of her pedigree than her
personality).￿
2document that dynastic legislators enter Congress at a similar age, have tenures of similar
length, are more educated, are less likely to have previous public o¢ ce experience, are more
likely to be women, and are more likely to enter Congress directly through the Senate. We
then address two basic questions that go to the heart of classic elite theory: ￿rst, does the
presence of political dynasties imply that political elites are self-perpetuating, in the sense
that holding political power increases the probability that one￿ s heirs attain political power
in the future? Second, does self-perpetuation hinder delegation to the politicians most valued
by voters?
We ￿nd evidence compatible with self-perpetuation in that legislators with longer tenures
are signi￿cantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress after them. Holding legisla-
tive power for more than one term is associated with a 40% increase in the likelihood that a
politician will have a relative entering Congress in the future. The fact that longer tenures
predict dynastic permanence in power is consistent with the idea that a longer hold on leg-
islative power augments a dynasty￿ s posterior attainment of power. However, the association
could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity between families. Original dynasty traits (old
money, genetic endowments, etc.) may explain both why a person had a long career and his
relatives gained legislative seats later on.3 To establish a causal relationship between tenure
length and posterior dynastic success, we use two instrumental variables approaches. Our
￿rst approach uses a regression discontinuity design relying on the outcome of close elections
as an instrument for tenure length (see Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 2001, and Lee,
Moretti and Butler 2004 for an application of regression discontinuity to elections). We ￿nd
that legislators that barely won their ￿rst reelection have a signi￿cantly higher chance of
having a relative entering Congress later in time than legislators that barely lost their ￿rst
reelection. This implies that holding power augments family asymmetries that a⁄ect the
access to political power. In the second approach we instrument for whether a legislator￿ s
￿rst reelection attempt is successful using the reelection rate of fellow party Representatives
in the same state and year. The second approach corroborates our ￿ndings.
In addition, we provide some evidence that the presence of political dynasties does not
re￿ ect delegation to politicians that are of most value to voters. We ￿nd that political
3The fact that dynastic legislators do not have longer tenures and have previous public experience less
often may be cautiously taken as an indication that they may not have superior skills or public service
vocation.
3competition is negatively associated with dynastic prevalence: dynastic legislators are less
frequent in delegations from states and times where the control of the state legislature is
more evenly divided between parties. This is compatible with the idea that the family traits
helping dynastic perpetuation are less e⁄ective in more competitive environments. One
possible explanation is that when a party safely controls a state, those in control of a party
can a⁄ord to favor candidates to whom they are connected by family or social ties. Under
more severe competition, party elites cannot a⁄ord strategies other than ￿elding the best
possible candidates, regardless of family connections. The fact that dynastic politicians are
less prevalent under stronger competition suggests that dynastic self-perpetuation in the US
Congress may get in the way of delegating power to the most valuable politicians.
Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission of
political power takes place. We show that superior original endowments (in terms of genes,
for instance) cannot be the whole explanation for political dynasties in the US Congress,
because exogenous shocks to dynastic power have an e⁄ect on dynastic permanence. This
is the de￿nition of the self-perpetuating force we detect. Various channels could contribute
to this self-perpetuation e⁄ect. For example, a longer tenure may a⁄ect the preferences of a
legislator￿ s family: for example, they may embrace a vocation for public service. However,
dynastic politicians are less likely to have previous public o¢ ce experience, suggesting that
dynastic politicians may not necessarily be characterized by a stronger vocation for public
service. Another possibility is that a longer tenure allows a legislator to accumulate an asset
that he then bequests￿ like ￿nancial, human, or political capital (name recognition, contacts).
In this paper we do not attempt to fully disentangle the role of each of these possibilities.
However, recall the fact that political competition and the prevalence of dynastic politicians
are negatively correlated. This fact suggests that dynastic transmission may be more related
to advantages such as superior contacts with party machines than to features valued by
voters, such as higher human capital.
Our results have implications for the equalizing role we expect democracy to play, and
for theories of the origins of modern democracy. Democratic societies may be expected to
mitigate inherited asymmetries in political power. However, if the very job of running an
equalizing democracy ampli￿es some of those asymmetries, equalization may be hindered.
Regarding the origins of modern democracy, recent work argues that because promises of
future redistribution from a King have no binding power, the introduction of democratic
4institutions may have acted as a credible guarantee of continuing redistributive policies (see
Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). The assumption that democratic institutions have binding
power is most probably a realistic one, but a fundamental question is how do constitutions
create commitment. A royal decree granting higher redistribution￿ a simple piece of paper￿
can be repealed by the King on the basis of sheer power. But the entire constitution￿
just another piece of paper￿ may also be repealed through the sheer exercise of power. An
important implication of the self-perpetuation result is that even transitory shocks a⁄ecting
the political power enjoyed by a family will have persistent e⁄ects. Therefore, institutions
spreading political power to new groups (and possibly endowing some of their members with
fame and connections) may have long term e⁄ects and become self-sustaining.
Work on the link between family connections and political power is to our knowledge
scarce. Camp (1982) documents that high percentages of Mexican political leaders between
1935 and 1980 belonged to politically established families. Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn
(1969) use biographical data of US legislators and look at the percentage of congressmen
belonging to politically connected families. They describe the evolution of that magnitude
over time and across regions of the US until 1961, and argue that the observed decrease
cannot simply be explained by population growth. In their view, the decrease re￿ ects mod-
ernization. Brandes Crook and Hibbing (1997) look at the impact of the election mode of
Senators on a number of dimensions, including the percentage of Senators coming from fam-
ilies that had placed a legislator before. Hess (1997) provides a detailed history of sixteen
American political dynasties. Our work is also related to recent progress on the theory and
evidence of legislative careers (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005, Merlo and Mattozzi 2005,
and Snyder and Padr￿ i Miquel 2006) and the composition of the political class (Caselli and
Morelli 2004, Dal B￿ and Di Tella 2003, Dal B￿ et al. 2006, Besley 2005, and Besley et al.,
2005).
Finally, our work is also related to a vast empirical literature measuring within family
income correlations across generations (see for instance Solon 1999, and references therein),
and to a vast literature in sociology that has measured intergenerational mobility across
occupations and status levels (see Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991 for a survey).4
4There is also a large theoretical literature on the intergenerational transmission of income (see, inter
alia, Becker and Tomes 1979, Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993, FernÆndez and Rogerson 2001; for a
network-based perspective, see Calv￿-Armengol and Jackson 2005).
5Our inquiry is analogous but focused on correlations in political power attainment within
families (although our approach contains intragenerational e⁄ects as well). Dynastic self-
perpetuation represents a way in which (political) inequality across families is reproduced
over time. Although our results do not necessarily imply that the reproduction of political
inequality contributes to the reproduction of economic inequality, our paper does expand the
study of the reproduction of inequality to a new dimension. Going beyond the measurement
of correlations, we also show that shocks a⁄ecting the political power of a person will have a
causal e⁄ect spilling over to family members (see Currie and Moretti 2003 for how education
shocks have intergenerational spillover e⁄ects).
The next section describes our data and documents patterns in the evolution and pro￿le
of dynastic legislators. Section 3 presents the basic ￿ndings regarding the connection be-
tween tenure length and the chance of having posterior relatives entering Congress. Section
4 presents the instrumental variables results. Section 5 presents our analysis of dynastic
political prevalence in connection with political competition. Section 6 concludes.
2 Political dynasties: sources of data, historical evolu-
tion and some characteristics
2.1 Sources of data
The data for this project come from multiple sources. First, the Congressional Biographical
Database (ICPSR study 7803) contains data on every Congressman from 1789 to 1996.
This dataset contains basic biographical information such as year of birth, prior experience,
and whether or not a legislator had relatives that were also in Congress. These data were
checked against the Congressional Biographical Directory, which has detailed information on
the relatives that any legislator had that were ever members of Congress. We observe that
almost 95% of all the family relationships can be categorized as close, see Table A1 in the
appendix.
We create two indicator variables to characterize political dynasties: Postrelatives and
Prerelatives. The former is equal to one whenever a legislator has a relative entering Congress
after he did, and zero otherwise. The latter is equal to one whenever a legislator had a relative
enter Congress before he did, and zero otherwise. Approximately 8:7% of Congressmen had
6previous relatives in o¢ ce (Prerelatives) and 8:5% had relatives entering Congress later
(Postrelatives) ￿ see Table A2 in the appendix. Table A2 also shows that 65% of legislators
stay in Congress for more than one term. A term for House Representatives is one congress
(two years), and three congresses (six years) for a Senator. The average tenure length (in
congresses) is 3:73. We now de￿ne two variables that will be used frequently: Longtermi
is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman i stayed in Congress for more than one
term, and Total tenure is a variable recording the total number of congresses served by a
legislator.
In order to instrument for tenure length in our study of self-perpetuation in Section 4:1,
we merged the biographical data with data from the Candidate and Constituency Statistics
of Elections in the United States (ICPSR study 7757). Since these two databases do not have
common individual identi￿ers, we employed a complex merging procedure which is detailed
in the appendix. For the universe of House elections we were able to match 28;560 elections
out of the possible 30;028 that occurred.5
Finally we merged in an additional data set that was used to construct the measure
of political competition used in Section 5. This dataset contains the party a¢ liations of
members of the state House and state Senate from 1878 until the present and was merged
by state and congressional term.6
2.2 Historical evolution
We start by reporting on some of the most conspicuous congressional dynasties in American
history in Table A3. The Breckinridge family is the ￿ largest￿political dynasty in terms of
both the number of members placed in Congress (17) and the total number of congresses
served (72). Its presence in Congress spans the period from 1789 to 1978. Other notable
families in Congress include the Aldrich, Frelinghuysen, Hiester, Kennedy and Lodge.
Our next step is to document the presence of political dynasties in Congress across time,
regions, chambers of Congress and the two main political parties. Consistently with Clubok,
5We only found minor di⁄erences among observables between elections that merged and those that did
not, save for the fact that elections that did not merge correctly seemed to occur earlier in our sample. This
is consistent with the quality of recording being poorer early in time. Otherwise the missing elections appear
to be random. We restrict our sample to House elections only. This is done mainly because before 1910 very
few Senators were directly elected, they were selected into o¢ ce. Thus for the most part including them in
our sample would add only a few data points and create substantial heterogenity.
6This data set was generously provided by Rui De Figueiredo.
7Wilensky and Berghorn (1969), we ￿nd that the percentage of legislators with relatives
(previous or posterior) in Congress has signi￿cantly decreased over time (see Figure 1A).
We also ￿nd that this decrease has continued in the second half of the twentieth century,
driven by a decrease of dynastic prevalence in the South (the level of dynastic prevalence
in the Non-South has stayed fairly constant since the late nineteenth century). The general
decrease of dynastic prevalence is also true when looking at legislators with either previous
or posterior relatives in o¢ ce (see Figure 1B and 1C). As shown in Figure 1B and Table 1
the decrease over time in the presence of dynastic legislators is statistically signi￿cant: while
12% of legislators were dynastic between 1789 and 1858, only 6% were dynastic after 1966.
There are regional di⁄erences in the presence of dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators
were more prevalent in the South than in the rest of the country. This di⁄erence is signi￿cant
before the Civil War and between the end of the Reconstruction period and World War II (see
Figure 2A and ￿rst panel of Table 1). Contrary to the trends portrayed by Clubok, Wilensky
and Berghorn (1969), we ￿nd that regional di⁄erences in the presence of dynastic legislators
have disappeared over time. The ￿rst panel of Table 1 shows that regional di⁄erences in the
presence of dynastic legislators is not signi￿cant after World War II. However, the di⁄erences
across regions regarding the entrance to Congress of dynastic politicians only disappeared
after the civil rights movement in the early sixties -see the second panel of Table 1.
There are important di⁄erences across chambers of Congress. The Senate has a statisti-
cally signi￿cant greater share of dynastic politicians than the House and this di⁄erence has
not disappeared with time (see Figure 2B and Table 1). Finally, dynastic legislators were
signi￿cantly more prevalent in the Democratic party than in the Republican party until the
end of the Reconstruction, but there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences across parties since then
(see Figure 2C and Table 1).
2.3 Personal characteristics and political careers of dynastic politi-
cians
In this section we study how the personal characteristics and the political careers of dynastic
legislators di⁄er from those of other legislators. We study the following characteristics. House
is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator ￿rst enters Congress through the House.
Age of entry is just the age of the legislator in the year of entry to Congress. Previous public
8experience is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator had public experience at the
time of entry to Congress. College degree is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator
had a college degree. Outsider is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator was from
a di⁄erent state than the one he represents. Female is an indicator variable equal to one if
the legislator is a woman.
Given the di⁄erence across regions and times on the number of dynastic politicians, simple
comparisons of means of the previous variables may be misleading. It is necessary to control
for the state the legislator comes from, and for the year of entry to Congress. Table 2 reports
OLS regressions on the association of legislator characteristics with having a previous relative
in Congress, controlling for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. We ￿nd that dynastic politicians
are less likely to start their career in the House, suggesting they have the ability or means
to enter directly through the Senate, a much smaller and prestigious body. This di⁄erence
cannot be attributed to a later entry into Congress: dynastic legislators enter Congress at
about 44 years of age, just like non-dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators are not more
likely to come from a state di⁄erent than the one they represent and are signi￿cantly less
likely to have previous public experience, although they are more likely to have a college
degree. Interestingly, dynastic legislators with a college education are signi￿cantly more
likely to have attended an Ivy League school than the rest of the college educated legislators.
It may be interesting to note that dynastic legislators and signi￿cantly more likely to be
female. In other words, dynastic membership seems to have facilitated the di¢ cult progress
of female political representation. In addition, we ￿nd that dynastic legislators do not have
longer careers in Congress. Table 3 shows that dynastic politicians are equally likely to
stay in Congress for more than one term and have similar tenure lengths to those of other
legislators.
3 Tenure and the probability of having relatives in
power in the future
In this section we estimate whether tenure in Congress increases the probability of having
relatives in Congress in the future. We estimate the following equation:
9Postrelativei = ￿ + ￿Longtermi + ￿Xi + ’s +  y:
Postrelativei is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman i has a relative in Congress
in the future, and as said before, Longtermi is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman
i stayed in Congress for more than one term and Xi is a vector of legislator i￿ s personal
characteristics. The coe¢ cients ’s and  y are state and year ￿xed e⁄ects that are used in
certain speci￿cations.78
Table 4 column (1) shows that 7:1% of the legislators that were in Congress for only one
term had a relative entering Congress after them while it increases to 9:3% if the legislator
stayed in o¢ ce for more than one term; the di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 1% level. Columns
(2) and (3) show a similar comparison when we eliminate people born after 1910 and those
who die in o¢ ce. We eliminate people born after 1910 so as to account for the censoring
that occurs because legislators at the end of the sample period have less time to establish
dynasties. We omit individuals who died in o¢ ce to ensure that our results are not driven
by the convention that when an individual dies in o¢ ce a relative might step in to take his
place. The coe¢ cient estimates remain largely unchanged and are statistically equivalent.
Column (4) reports a regression controlling for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿xed
e⁄ects do not change the results markedly. When further controls are added in column (5)
the estimate of ￿ does not change. This suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to bias
upwards our estimate of the e⁄ect of tenure on having relatives in future congresses.
Other personal characteristics correlate with having relatives in future congresses. Leg-
islators with Prerelatives are 16% more likely to have Postrelatives. Senators and legislators
whose chamber of entry was the House and then eventually moved to the Senate have a 5%
and 6:8% higher probability, respectively, of having a relative follow them into o¢ ce than
legislators who remained in the House. These ￿ndings suggest that more successful career
patterns (politicians who are always Senators or who start as Representatives but eventually
7The ￿year￿e⁄ects are in fact entering congress e⁄ects, so they are a dummy for every two years corre-
sponding to the same congress. The ￿rst one corresponds to the years 1789 and 1790. For brevity, we refer
to congress e⁄ects as year e⁄ects throughout.
8The use of binary outcome variables would suggest that non-linear maximum likelihood methods would
be desirable. However, the consistency of these estimators is dubious in the analysis of panel data; this is
the well known incidental parameters problem (see Neyman and Scott, 1948, or Lancaster, 2000). Therefore
we focus on the analysis using ordinary least squares; however, the results are robust to using a potentially
inconsistent probit estimator.
10ascend to the Senate) are associated with a higher likelihood of starting or continuing a
dynasty.
We obtain similar results if we focus on the total number of congresses served, total tenure,
instead of an indicator variable for more than one term. Figure 3 shows the proportion of
congressmen with Postrelatives by the number of terms they served. There is a clear positive
relation between total tenure and Postrelatives with the impact of terms decreasing with the
number of terms served. Table 5 presents the regression estimates which are similar to those
in Table 4. Starting in column (6) we also run the results using a quadratic term of total
tenure. The quadratic term is negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, re￿ ecting the
fact that there are decreasing marginal returns to tenure in terms of future relatives in o¢ ce.
The marginal impact on the probability of a relative entering congress in the future of going
from one term to two terms is between 1.3% and 3%.
4 Does a longer tenure increase the chance of having
a relative holding power in the future?
The fact that congressmen with longer tenures are more likely to have relatives in future
congresses could be due to unobserved family characteristics. In this section we employ
two strategies to determine whether tenure in o¢ ce has a causal impact on the probability
of a congressman￿ s relative being elected into a future congress. First, we focus on House
Representatives that attempted a reelection and compare those that barely won their ￿rst
reelection with those that barely lost, that is, we use a regression discontinuity approach.
Second, we use the re-election rates of a legislator￿ s cohort as an instrument for his re-election.
4.1 Close elections
To identify the causal impact of tenure we start by using a very simple approach that relies
on a comparison between congressmen who barely won their ￿rst reelection with those who
barely lost. The identifying assumption in this regression discontinuity analysis is that close
elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the categories of winners and
losers, instead of being driven by family characteristics. This assumption could be criticized
if elections were rigged such that winning could depend on personal characteristics that are
11also correlated with having Postrelatives. Snyder (2005) ￿nds evidence consistent with the
idea that the vote counting process is biased in favor of incumbents in the U.S. House with
more than two terms. However, there is no evidence of such manipulation taking place in
￿rst re-election attempts, which is the focus of this study. It could also be argued that
legislators with relatives previously in Congress may be more able to rig election tallies. To
eliminate this possibility we focus on congressmen without Prerelatives for the rest of this
section. We also exclude congressmen who died in o¢ ce or were born after 1910 as in the
previous section.
Table 6 shows the percentage of Congress members with Postrelatives conditional on the
results of the ￿rst reelection attempt (barely lost vs. barely won). Of the congressmen that
lost by less than a 2.5% margin of the vote, 2.8% have Postrelatives in Congress. Instead,
of those that won by up to a 2.5% margin, 7.12% have Postrelatives in Congress. A similar
increase is observed for the 5% window and both di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant (p-
values of 0.024 and 0.01 respectively).
We argue that in such a small window winners and losers are identical so that any
di⁄erence in Postrelatives should be attributed to the di⁄erent outcome in the ￿rst reelection
and not to personal or family characteristics. The data support this assumption. As Table 6
shows, at the 2.5% and 5% windows, only one characteristic out of 11 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
at the 10% level between winners and losers. This suggests that it is not an unobserved
family characteristic that causes both long tenures and Postrelatives for congressmen in
close reelections, but that staying in power for longer increases the probability of forming a
dynasty.
However, the previous analysis fails to consider that not all losers of a ￿rst reelection
were one-term congressmen: some ran again and reentered Congress after losing their ￿rst
reelection attempt. Therefore, the di⁄erences in Table 6 underestimate the e⁄ect of being a
long term legislator on the chance of having relatives in Congress later in time. To solve this
problem we implement an IV regression in which we estimate the probability of serving more
than one term in Congress as a function of the ￿rst reelection outcome in the ￿rst stage. In
a second stage, we estimate the e⁄ect of Longterm on Postrelative using the predicted value
of Longterm from the ￿rst stage.
12We estimate the following equation in the ￿rst stage:
Longtermi = ￿ + ￿Wini + ￿Xi (1 ￿ Wini) + ’r (1 ￿ Wini) +  d (1 ￿ Wini);
where Longtermi is an indicator equal to one if congressman i was in Congress for more than
one term, Wini is an indicator equal to one if the congressman won his ￿rst reelection attempt
and Xi is a vector of personal characteristics. The coe¢ cients ’r and  d are region and
decade ￿xed e⁄ects. All controls including the region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects are interacted
with losing. This is done to adjust for the fact that all winners of the ￿rst reelection attempt
had long term careers; in other words, controls are used to explain variation across losers.9
The default decade is the 1880s and the default region is the North-East (Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania). The coe¢ cient on Wini measures the average impact of winning
on the probability of being a long term legislator conditional on region and decade e⁄ects.
Table 7 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for the ￿rst stage. Winning the ￿rst reelection
and its interactions are a good predictor of staying in Congress for more than one term at the
2:5% and 5% windows, after controlling for various legislator characteristics. The explanatory
variables of the ￿rst stages are jointly signi￿cant with F statistics always greater than 60:
the instruments are strong.
The equation we estimate in the second stage is as follows:
Postrelativei = ￿ + ￿ \ Longtermi + ￿Xi + ’r +  d;
where \ Longtermi is the estimated probability of having more than one term in o¢ ce as
predicted by the ￿rst stage. In these regressions we use region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects in
order to minimize problems with statistical power. We do however incorporate state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects in subsequent speci￿cations with more observations.
Table 8 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for the second stage. Being in Congress for
more than one term has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of having a Postrelative in
Congress. This is the case for both the 2:5% and 5% margin of votes windows and whether
or not we control for observable characteristics or we include legislators with Prerelatives.
9Since all the winners have Longterm = 1 and all the personal characteristics and ￿xed e⁄ects are
interacted with losing, ￿ + ￿ = 1.
13The magnitude of the e⁄ect ranges from 3:1% to 5:2%.
We obtain similar results if we use the total number of terms and its square. In the ￿rst
stage we estimate the following equations:
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where Totaltenure2
i is the square of Totaltenurei. We present the estimates from the ￿rst
stage in Table 9. The explanatory variables of the ￿rst stages are jointly signi￿cant with F
statistics always greater than 20: the instruments are strong.
In the second stage we estimate the following equation:
Postrelativei = ￿ + ￿ \ Totaltenurei + ￿
0 \ Totaltenure2
i + ￿Xi + ’r +  d:
Table 10 shows the estimated coe¢ cients from the second stage. The linear e⁄ect of an
extra term in power on the probability of having a Postrelative ranges from 3:9% to 6:3%.
The marginal e⁄ect of a second term in power (denoted as TE(2-1) in Table 10) is positive,
ranging from 2:8% to 4:2%, and always signi￿cant at the 10% level.
The results presented this far are based on congressmen within a small window of victory
or defeat in their ￿rst reelection (vote margins of 2:5% or 5%). We include next more
congressmen (within 25% margin of victory or defeat).10 This sample includes legislators
that won or lost by large margins and therefore the reelection outcome cannot be thought
to be random. We then control for the direct e⁄ect that the margin of votes may have on
whether a legislator has Postrelatives by including a high order polynomial in the margin of
votes. In other words, we apply the global polynomial estimation technique developed by
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) (see also Van der Klaauw 2002).
Figure 4 shows the proportion of congressmen with Postrelatives in Congress depending
on the margin of votes by which they won or lost their ￿rst reelection attempt. The ￿gure
also shows the estimated quartic polynomial on vote margin with a 95% con￿dence interval
allowing for a discontinuity at 0% margin of votes. There is a clear discontinuity at that
10We focus on the 25% window since a large fraction of the observations fall in this interval and data with
extreme vote margins seem less reliable. However, the results that follow are robust to considering all the
data.
14value: winners are more likely to have relatives coming into Congress later on even when
the polynomial is absorbing any direct e⁄ect that the margin of votes (or the variables that
cause it) may have on Postrelatives.
However, Figure 4 fails to control for other observable characteristics and the fact that
not all losers had only one term. To solve this problem we utilize, as before, the result from
the ￿rst reelection to estimate the probability of being a long term legislator. Figure 4 shows
the relationship of Longterm and Total tenure with the margin of votes legislators obtain
in their ￿rst reelection attempt. The ￿gure also shows the estimated quartic polynomial
with a 95% con￿dence interval. There is a clear discontinuity at 0%: winners are more
likely to serve a longer tenure. We can use the result from the ￿rst reelection attempt as an
instrument for tenure and are able to identify the e⁄ect of tenure on Postrelatives as before.
The equation we estimate in the ￿rst stage is as follows:




s (1 ￿ Wini)+’r (1 ￿ Wini)+ d (1 ￿ Wini):
Table 11 shows the estimated coe¢ cients. Win predicts becoming a long term legislator in
the 25% window when controlling for the margin of votes. This is robust to including state
and year ￿xed e⁄ects, congressmen with Prerelatives and larger margin of vote windows.
Again, the F statistics for joint signi￿cance are large.
In a second stage we estimate the following equation:




s + ’r +  d:
The second stage results in Table 12 show a clear positive e⁄ect of Longterm on Postrel-
atives. In the 25% window Longterm is signi￿cant with a magnitude ranging from 4:7%
to 6:6%. In the 40% window the e⁄ect of Longterm is also signi￿cant and with similar
magnitude.
These results are robust to considering Total tenure instead of Longterm ￿ see tables
13 and 14. The linear e⁄ect of an extra congress in power on the probability of having a
Postrelative ranges from 2:2% to 4:9%. The marginal e⁄ect of a second term in the House
is positive, ranging from 1:6% to 3:7%, and always signi￿cant.
These results suggest that the longer one￿ s tenure, the more likely one is to establish a
15political dynasty, and that this relationship is causal. The identifying assumption in our
analysis is that close elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the cate-
gories of winners and losers. We provided evidence of this for small windows in Table 6.
To provide further evidence in support of this assumption, we estimate the relationship be-
tween tenure and all personal characteristics using the regression discontinuity design. The
estimated model always includes a quartic polynomial on vote margin.11 We present the
estimates in Table A4 with region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects. First, we ￿nd that the estimates
of the impact of Longterm on Postrelatives are robust to considering large windows (in small
windows the coe¢ cients remain high but the much higher standard errors damage signi￿-
cance). Second, for some windows one out of nine observables appears unbalanced. However,
such lack of balance is not robust to using larger windows. Another robustness check is to
introduce state and year ￿xed e⁄ects (instead of region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects). Table A5
presents the estimates with state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. While the e⁄ect of Longterm on
Postrelative continues to be signi￿cant for most vote margin windows with many observa-
tions, the imbalances in predetermined observables disappear almost completely. Overall,
the e⁄ect of a long term career on having posterior relatives in o¢ ce appears fairly robust
and not the result of noisy data in a particular vote margin window. On the contrary, the
imbalances in the predetermined observables of our sample are few and not robust.12
4.2 Using the reelection rates of a legislator￿ s cohort
In this section we implement an alternative instrumental variables strategy to estimate the
causal e⁄ect of congressional tenure on having a relative attaining legislative o¢ ce. We use
the reelection probabilities of any given congressman￿ s current cohort, by state and party, as
an instrument for his reelection probabilities.13 For example, consider a House member going
for his ￿rst reelection in California in the year 1892. The instrument for this congressman￿ s
11The exercise can be explained thus. If, say, the military are much more prevalent among winners (indi-
cating that the assignment may not be random), then the close connection between winning and Longterm
should make Longterm as instrumented by Win a signi￿cant variable in a model where Military is the
dependent variable. A similar picture emerges using state and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
12Going beyond our default sample, the examination of Prerelatives across winners and losers does suggest
an imbalance. Legislators with prerelatives tend to be overrepresented among winners. The regressions ran
to check that the results are robust to including legislators with prerelatives control for that characteristic,
however, suggesting that it does not drive the result in those regressions.
13A similar strategy was used by Levitt and Snyder (1998) to examine the impact of federal spending on
electoral outcomes.
16￿rst reelection is the reelection rates of congressmen of the same party in California in the
year 1892. The idea is that there is an underlying common shock to all of the individuals
in this cohort that is independent of the characteristics of the individual attempting to get
reelected. We use this common shock as a source of exogenous variation in congressional
tenure to identify the impact of tenure on having relatives follow into o¢ ce. In our pre-
ferred speci￿cation we include ￿xed e⁄ects by state-decade combinations, so we identify the
reelection shock relative to a given state-decade.14 In the example of the congressman from
California in 1892, we would only compare the shock in California in 1892 to other shocks
in California in the 1890￿ s.
The identifying assumption is that the current electoral shocks to an individual￿ s cohort
will a⁄ect his probability of having a relative coming into o¢ ce only through the channel of
whether the congressman stays in o¢ ce or not.
We use the following formula to construct the instrument for congressman i within a







where reelectj is a dummy variable equal to one if j, in the same state/year/party, was
reelected. This formula gives the probability of an individual in the cohort being reelected.15
In our preferred speci￿cation, we estimate the ￿rst stage equation:
Longtermi = ￿ + ￿Electinstrumenti + ￿Xi + ’sd;
where ’sd captures state-decade ￿xed e⁄ects. Thus we obtain the impact of the instrument
on Longterm only within a given state-decade group. In general the ￿rst stage is quite strong
(Table 15). We ￿nd a highly signi￿cant impact of the reelection instrument on Longterm.
We then proceed to estimate the second stage equation with the instrumented Longterm:
Postrelativei = ￿ + ￿ \ Longtermi + ￿Xi + ’sd:
We include the state-decade e⁄ects to restrict identifying variation to that in small region-
14One speci￿cation looks at state-quarter pairs. We do not have enough observations so as to try state-year
￿xed e⁄ects.
15This of course subtracts out the result of the individual for whom the instrument is being created.
17time groups. Table 16 presents the second stage estimates. Across all of the speci￿cations we
￿nd that the estimate of Longterm is largely consistent with estimates from the regression
discontinuity design approach. In column (1) we use state-quarter e⁄ects while in column
(2) we use our preferred speci￿cation with state-decade e⁄ects. We ￿nd that in both spec-
i￿cations the results are positive, signi￿cant, and of the same order of magnitude as our
previous regression discontinuity estimates. However somewhat surprisingly in column (3)
we ￿nd that when we exclude individuals with previous relatives the results become weaker
and the estimate becomes insigni￿cant. This stands in contrast to our previous regression
discontinuity speci￿cation. However we can not refute that any of the estimates di⁄er within
Table 16 or across the di⁄erent approaches. Column (4) reports our overall preferred speci-
￿cation, which excludes individuals whose Postrelatives entered within ten years of the ￿rst
individual￿ s ￿rst reelection. This exclusion attempts to rule out cases where the shock to a
legislator￿ s reelection could have a direct e⁄ect on the entry of a posterior relative through
a channel other than the legislator￿ s tenure. For example, if shocks are serially correlated,
it could be that a high rate of reelections for Democrats in California in 1892 is associated
with more power accruing to Democrats in general in the immediate years. Therefore, the
Postrelative of a democrat legislator, being likely to be a democrat in California himself, may
be more likely to attain power soon afterwards. When we focus on relatives that enter more
than a decade after the ￿rst reelection attempt occurred, we sever that potential channel.
The result in column (4) is signi￿cant at the 5%. Finally in column (5) we exclude legislators
with previous relatives and exclude entry of posterior relatives within ten years and ￿nd a
weaker, though signi￿cant result. Taken together, these results are consistent with those
obtained from the regression discontinuity approach.
5 Dynastic prevalence and political competition
In this section we study the impact of political dynasties on the quality of politicians. To
do so we examine whether dynasties thrive when political competition increases. If political
competition promotes the selection of legislators who are more valuable to voters, and dy-
nasties are not valued by voters, we should observe that political dynasties are less prevalent
when competition increases. We ￿nd that increases in political competition are associated
with fewer political dynasties, suggesting that political competition reduces the dynastic
18transmission of political power and that political dynasties are not valued by voters.
For this analysis we use a political competition index constructed upon party dominance
of state legislatures. This index has a minimum value of ￿0:5 when 100% of the seats
in the state legislature in a given year belong to the same party. This index increases as
the percentage of seats held by a majority party decreases. The maximum value of the
index is zero, corresponding to the case when the total number of seats (including the
two chambers) held by the two largest parties is split 50-50 between these two parties.







￿ ￿, where LHDij (LHRij) and UHDij (UHRij) represent
the number of seats that Democrats (Republicans) hold in the lower and upper chambers of
the state legislature, respectively, during year j.
Table 17 presents estimates from a regression of the percentage of legislators with Prerel-
atives representing state i and who enter congress in year j on the political competition in
state i and in year j. The ￿rst two speci￿cations, in columns (1) and (2) respectively, capture
the political competition index through a quadratic polynomial. Political competition is a
highly signi￿cant predictor of the prevalence of dynastic politicians. A graphical representa-
tion of the political competition polynomial indicates that as the index moves from -0.5 to 0
(i.e., as political competition increases) the percentage of politicians coming from politically
connected families decreases￿ see Figure 6.
In columns (3) and (4) we report estimates from a regression of the percentage of legis-
lators with Prerelatives on dummy variables for each quintile of political competition. The
omitted dummy is the one corresponding to the ￿rst, or less competitive, quintile. The
dummy corresponding to the highest degree of state level political competition is not al-
ways signi￿cant, although it is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the coe¢ cient for the dummy
corresponding to the fourth quintile, either. These estimates suggest that increases in po-
litical competition are associated with decreases in dynastic politicians at a decreasing rate,
consistent with the results in columns (1) and (2).
One possible explanation of our ￿ndings is that when a party safely controls a state, the
state and national leadership of the party can a⁄ord to favor ￿elite￿candidates with whom
they are connected by family or social ties. Because these candidates may not always be
the best, favoring them costs the party leadership some extra probability of not winning a
seat. In very safe states, this cost is negligible, however, while the private returns to favoring
19friends and family may be substantial. The party leadership at the state and national level
can favor particular legislative candidates is various ways, such as by directing resources
to those candidates at the primary campaign stage. Under more severe competition, the
party leadership may not be able to a⁄ord any strategy other than ￿elding the best possible
candidates, regardless of their family connections. Doing otherwise may cost the party too
much in terms of a larger likelihood of losing seats in Congress, which damages the party￿ s
power both at the state and national level.
6 Conclusion
We document patterns in the evolution and pro￿le of political dynasties in the Congress of
the United States since its inception in 1789. We then explore the dynastic transmission of
political power with a focus on the presence of self-perpetuation, a force that theorists such
as Pareto, Michels, and Mosca thought to play a signi￿cant role. We show that the tenure
length of legislators is correlated with the probability of their having a relative entering
Congress in the future. This probability increases by roughly three percentage points when
gaining reelection at least once, which entails a 40% increase over the baseline probability.
While this correlation could be due to unobserved family characteristics, two di⁄erent IV
strategies allow us to determine that there is an important causal component: having a long
tenure in Congress increases the probability of establishing a dynasty. In other words, a
dynasty￿ s longer experience with power at one point in time increases its chances of holding
power later in time, implying that a self-perpetuating force a⁄ects the composition of political
elites. Put di⁄erently, shocks to political power have persistent e⁄ects. Finally, we study
the connection between dynastic prevalence and political competition. We ask whether the
advantages of elite politicians stem from features that are valuable to voters. Since political
competition should promote the success of politicians that are more valuable to voters, the
fact that dynastic politicians are less prevalent under stronger competition suggests that
dynastic politicians are not the most valued by voters. Hence, the dynastic self-perpetuation
e⁄ect we detect in the US Congress may have hindered voters￿will to delegate to the most
valuable politicians.
Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission of
political power takes place. First, the fact that there is a causal relationship between tenure
20length and the probability of starting or continuing a dynasty shows that superior original
endowments (in terms of genes, for instance) cannot fully explain the observed political
dynasties. Second, the fact that dynastic politicians are less likely to have previous public
o¢ ce experience suggests that dynastic politicians may not be characterized by a stronger
vocation for public service. This is contrary to the idea that relatives of successful politicians
may develop a vocation for public service. Finally, the fact that more political competition
is associated with less dynastic politicians suggests that dynastic transmission may be more
related to advantages such as superior contacts with party machines than to features valued
by voters, such as valuable experience or superior human capital. We leave for future research
a more detailed study of the di⁄erent channels through which political power is transmitted.
217 Appendix
7.1 Merging
We merged the biographical dataset and the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of
Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 (ICPSR study 7757) by matching each candi-
date/Congressional term observation in the Biographical Database with the subsequent re-
election attempt from the elections data. For example when Newton Gingrich served in the
96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with a reelection attempt to
enter into the 97th Congress. Unfortunately the data from the elections database is not
comprehensive and many elections are missing. Additionally merging between the Congres-
sional Biographical database and the elections database is complicated by the fact that they
only common identi￿ers between both data sets are the year, state, and names of the candi-
dates. After removing elections where there are multiple winners16 and elections where no
names were associated with the candidates17 we are left with 30,028 house elections.18 This
stands in contrast with the 34,271 House member/Congress observations in the Biographical
Database.
To merge the data sets we employed a multi-stage merging procedure. We ￿rst merged on
state/Congressional term/last name and kept all of the merges that were unique. For the re-
maining unmerged observations we then merged on state/Congressional term/last name/￿rst
letter of ￿rst name19 and kept all of the unique merges. Finally we iterated the same process
for state/Congress/last name/￿rst and second letter of the ￿rst name. At this point the
merging yield a mere 55 unique matches. After these merges we were able to match 23,016
observations from the elections database and the biographical database. Beyond the fact that
many elections were not recorded, this gap can be substantially attributed to the fact that
many candidates decided not to run for reelection, which would make a merge impossible
since they would not show up in the elections data set. For instance had Newton Gingrich
16Historically there have been elections where the top two or more candidates were elected to Congress.
Upon inspection we found that these elections tend to have results that are confusing and do not match with
results from other sources. For the time being we have decided to drop these elections out.
17This makes merging on candidate name quite di¢ cult.
18We have decided to focus on House elections since for our purposes the Senate will not add a substancial
amount of data since Senators were not elected until the beginning of the twentieth century, are much less
in number than House members, and have less frequent election cycles.
19We only merged on the ￿rst letter of the ￿rst name because the ￿rst names in the elections dataset were
often garbled and incomplete.
22decided to retire after serving in the 96th Congress no entry would appear in the elections
database. Not surprisingly, the data that failed to merge disproportionately comes from the
earlier years where recording was markedly more sporadic.
To further assess the e¢ cacy of the merge, we merged the data again, but by matching
the Biographical data with the election prior to entry. For example when Newton Gingrich
served in the 96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with the election
in 1978 to enter into the 96th Congress. Despite the fact that this is not the type of merge
that we use in the paper, it is informative since it will enable us to conduct a diagnostic
of whether there are systematic biases in the sample.20 When conducting the merge in this
manner we were able match 28,560 elections out of the possible 30,028. To analyze whether
our sample is systematically biased we regress the probability that there is a successful merge
on a large set of Congressmen characteristics as well as ￿xed e⁄ects for each state and decade
(i.e. a California 1890 ￿xed e⁄ect). In the unreported analysis we ￿nd suggestive evidence
that there is little systematic bias in the sample, with some notable exceptions. We ￿nd
that elections where women won are 7% less likely to be matched to results. Individuals
who go onto to further civic service are also 1.5% less likely to be matched to election
results. However important variables such as whether an individual has family members
in Congress do not appear to be systematically biased in the sample, conditioning on the
state-decade ￿xed e⁄ect. As mentioned above, while merges are markedly more successful
in later years, conditional on the year we do not see systematic di⁄erences in many of the
variables of interest, which suggests that much of the omitted data is random. These merge
considerations only apply to the analysis in Section 4:2 where we use the elections data as
an instrument.
20The problem with analyzing the the data that was merged as above is that characteristics of politicians
(such as gender, age, etc.) would be correlated with the decision to retire from o¢ ce. Thus if we observed
women were much less likely to have a successful merge it would be impossible to determine if that was due
to data being less likely to be recorded or women being less likely to choose to run for re-election. This
problem does not occur in the alternative merging technique.
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26Totals South Non-South Difference Senate House Difference Democrats Republicans Difference
Overall .08824 0.11722 0.07386 0.04336 0.13499 0.07674 0.05825 0.08311 0.0733 0.00981
[.00371] [.00744] [.00412] [.00851]*** [.01052] [.0035] [.0107]*** [.00611] [.00595] [.00852]
1788-1859 0.12065 0.14581 0.10309 0.04272 0.12678 0.119 0.00778
[.0075] [.01395] [.00812] [.01614]*** [.01699] [.00763] [.01742]
1860-1865 0.10128 0.07407 0.10565 -0.03158 0.14595 0.0874 0.05855
[.01436] [.03541] [.01567] [.03871] [.03671] [.0874] [.03961]
1866-1879 0.10675 0.13334 0.09422 0.03911 0.20096 0.08081 0.12015 0.15254 0.06905 0.08349
[.00105] [.02] [.01227] [.02346]* [.03178] [.00946] [.0327]*** [.01881] [.01177] [.02219]***
1880-1939 0.089 0.13496 0.06773 0.06723 0.15945 0.0722 0.08725 0.09415 0.08355 0.0106
[.00619] [.01367] [.06723] [.01509]*** [.01868] [.00565] [.01889]*** [.00913] [.00846] [.0106]
1940-1965 0.0673 0.08315 0.0602 0.023 0.09532 0.06048 0.03584 0.06311 0.07285 -0.00974
[.00753] [.01537] [.00846] [.02295] [.02075] [.00766] [.02175]* [.00957] [.07285] [.01544]
1966-1996 0.06178 0.06917 0.0584 0.01076 0.10564 0.0517 0.05394 0.06577 0.05402 0.01175
[.00751] [.0126] [.00932] [.01567] [.02335] [.00725] [.02418]** [.01046] [.0103] [.01175]
Totals South Non-South Difference Senate House Difference Democrats Republicans Difference
Overall 0.08677 0.11805 0.07316 0.04489 0.12998 0.08146 0.04852 0.08055 0.06934 0.01121
[.00263] [.00548] [.00291] [.00571]*** [.0095] [.00271] [.00841]*** [.00443] [.00424] [.00614]*
1788-1859 0.1098 0.13766 0.095 0.04266 0.12834 0.10768 0.02066
[.00518] [.00969] [.00601] [.01086]*** [.01732] [.00542] [.01707]
1860-1865 0.09384 0.04167 0.10239 -0.06072 0.21951 0.07667 0.14284
[.01581] [.02915] [.01774] [.04542] [.06545] [.01539] [.04808]***
1866-1879 0.08588 0.10837 0.07403 0.03435 0.2 0.0717 0.1283 0.1173 0.05919 0.05811
[.00817] [.01544] [.00944] [.01717]** [.03522] [.00798] [.02561]*** [.01436] [.00932] [.01436]***
1880-1939 0.08025 0.12382 0.06396 0.05986 0.13044 0.07427 0.05617 0.07893 0.08251 -0.00358
[.00436] [.01013] [.0046] [.00974]*** [.01657] [.00445] [.0141]*** [.00605] [.00643] [.00882]
1940-1965 0.06726 0.1051 0.05435 0.05075 0.08523 0.06427 0.02096 0.07456 0.05667 0.01789
[.00713] [.01733] [.00748] [.01632]*** [.02111] [.00713] [.0204] [.01005] [.0099] [.01431]
1966-1996 0.05627 0.06789 0.05063 0.01725 0.09244 0.05218 0.04025 0.06187 0.0507 0.01117
[.00673] [.01287] [.00781] [.01435] [.02666] [.00685] [.02228]* [.00986] [.00918] [.0135]
Standard errors in brackets (clustered at legislator level in first table). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Party differences shown after 1866 when the modern two party system emerged.
Table 1: Sample Means of Proportion of Legislators With Previous Relatives
Flows: Proportion of freshman legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is only counted in congress of entry
Stocks: Proportion of legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is counted in every congress he/she is in office.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
House House Age of entry Age of entry Pre. public off. Pre. public off. College degree College degree Outsider Outsider Female Female
Previous Relative -0.07503 -0.0764 -0.50866 -0.34821 -0.05641 -0.05611 0.14033 0.12945 -0.03102 -0.02571 0.02492 0.02566
[0.01842]*** [0.01780]*** [0.35166] [0.29524] [0.01849]*** [0.01734]*** [0.01805]*** [0.01718]*** [0.02218] [0.02038] [0.00795]*** [0.00771]***
House -4.98911 -0.00657 -0.05303 -0.02909 0.00884
[0.32099]*** [0.01575] [0.01784]*** [0.01412]** [0.00438]**
Age of entry -0.00619 0.00559 -0.00762 0.00543 0.00071
[0.00078]*** [0.00058]*** [0.00047]*** [0.00080]*** [0.00019]***
Pre. public office -0.00351 2.40951 0.00453 -0.0788 -0.00191
[0.00819] [0.26049]*** [0.01136] [0.01192]*** [0.00421]
College degree -0.02606 -3.01501 0.00417 -0.08569 0.00314
[0.00757]*** [0.17918]*** [0.01042] [0.01593]*** [0.00207]
Outsider -0.01264 1.90007 -0.06401 -0.07575 0.0085
[0.00594]** [0.27805]*** [0.01059]*** [0.01417]*** [0.00385]**
Female 0.05167 3.33733 -0.02092 0.03731 0.11441
[0.02664]* [0.76922]*** [0.04658] [0.02341] [0.04944]**
Constant 1.05567 1.25058 27.32269 34.84151 -0.03379 -0.16729 0.8865 1.16926 0.24887 0.20351 0.0088 -0.02484
[0.00278]*** [0.02223]*** [0.06347]*** [0.40889]*** [0.00401]*** [0.02506]*** [0.00311]*** [0.02570]*** [0.00431]*** [0.02953]*** [0.00094]*** [0.00846]***
Year YYYYYYYYYYYY
State YYYYYYYYYYYY
Observations 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765
R-squared 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.09
Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death and born after 1800.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: The effect of previous relatives on personal characteristics(1) (2) (3) (4)
longterm longterm totaltenure totaltenure
Previous Relative 0.00995 0.02084 0.0706 -0.04164
[0.01974] [0.02001] [0.14075] [0.13742]
House 0.2181 -1.03206
[0.02055]*** [0.14718]***
Age of entry -0.00663 -0.08639
[0.00058]*** [0.00657]***
Pre. public office 0.05972 0.52768
[0.01084]*** [0.08598]***






Constant 0.92853 0.85211 2.53806 5.88934
[0.00358]*** [0.03266]*** [0.02882]*** [0.23957]***
Year YYYY
State YYYY
Observations 8765 8765 8765 8765
R-squared 0.1 0.14 0.17 0.22
Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death and born after 1800.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: The effect of previous relatives on tenure lengthDependent Variable: Postrelatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Longterm 0.02144 0.01835 0.02667 0.02901 0.02892
[0.00491]*** [0.00409]*** [0.00459]*** [0.00431]*** [0.00454]***
Constant 0.07125 0.06598 0.07174 0.36106 0.24623



















House to Senate 0.06844
[0.02305]***
Senate to House 0.0877
[0.06448]
Age of entry decade NNNNY
Death age decade NNNNY
Year Effects N N N Y Y
State Effects N N N Y Y
Died in office excluded N YYYY
Born before 1910 N N Y Y Y
Observations 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490
R-squared 0 0 0 0.09 0.13
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Tenure length and Postrelatives(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total tenure 0.0041 0.00231 0.00439 0.00763 0.00561 0.0081 0.0069 0.01345 0.0158 0.01362
[0.00084]*** [0.00074]*** [0.00101]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00095]*** [.00198]*** [.00191]*** [.00231]*** [.00232]*** [0.00208]***
Total tenure^2 -0.00035 -0.00035 -0.00068 -0.00061 -0.00058
[-.00012]** [.0012]*** [.00014]*** [.0013]*** [0.00011]***
Constant 0.06993 0.06958 0.07399 0.35418 0.24198 0.060612 0.06061 0.05742 0.07422 0.01392

















Senate only 0.03655 0.03831
[0.01136]*** [0.01320]***
House to Senate 0.04998 0.04788
[0.02342]** [0.02262]*
Senate to House 0.08485 0.00032
[0.06249] [0.06029]
Age of entry decade NNNNYNNNNY
Death age decade NNNNYNNNNY
Year Effects N N N Y Y N N N Y Y
State Effects N N N Y Y N N N Y Y
Died in office excluded N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Born before 1910 N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Observations 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490
R-squared 0 0 0 0.09 0.13 0 0 0 0.09 0.13
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Tenure length and Postrelatives
Dependent Variable: Postrelatives2.5% window 5% window
Win Lose Difference Win Lose Difference
Posterior relative in office 0.071 0.028 0.043 0.067 0.031 0.035
[.016] [.01] [.019]** [.01] [.008] [.013]**
Year 1885.48 1887.00 -2.41 1885.01 1888.88 -3.87
[2.04] [2.14] [2.96] [1.42] [1.65] [2.16]*
Age at entry 43.88 44.68 -0.8 43.82 44.72 -0.90
[.55] [.6] [.81] [.37] [.44] [.57]
Age at death 71.18 71.00 0.18 71.51 70.90 0.61
[.75] [.78] [1.08] [.48] [.57] [.74]
Female 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001
[.005] [.006] [.008] [.003] [.003] [.004]
College degree 0.607 0.633 -0.027 0.600 0.606 -0.006
[.03] [.03] [.043] [.02] [.022] [.03]
Outsider to state 0.449 0.422 0.027 0.422 0.436 -0.014
[.03] [.031] [.044] [.02] [.023] [.031]
Previous public office 0.783 0.869 -0.086 0.803 0.826 -0.023
[.025] [.021] [.033]** [.016] [.017] [.024]
Military 0.300 0.295 0.005 0.316 0.281 0.035
[.028] [.029] [.04] [.019] [.021] [.028]
Lawyer 0.663 0.596 0.067 0.611 0.567 0.044
[.029] [.031] [.043] [.02] [.023] [.031]
Farmer 0.042 0.065 -0.023 0.062 0.062 0.000
[.012] [.016] [.02] [.01] [.011] [.015]
Business 0.272 0.318 -0.046 0.292 0.329 -0.037
[.028] [.03] [.041] [.019] [.022] [.027]
Observations 251 267 477 588
Sample: Individuals with no pre-relatives, who did not die in office, and who were born before 1910
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Characteristics of close winners versus close losers in first re-election attempt(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 5% 5% 5%
Win 0.85671 0.54542 0.48855 0.90842 0.56498 0.53381
[0.08332]*** [0.36102] [0.34155] [0.05078]*** [0.16343]*** [0.15742]***
Female*(1-Win) -0.28485 -0.30062 -0.25325 -0.25486
[0.16346]* [0.16208]* [0.12338]** [0.12287]**
College degree*(1-Win) 0.02928 0.02143 0.04147 0.03663
[0.06800] [0.06610] [0.04448] [0.04367]
Outsider*(1-Win) -0.0457 -0.05481 0.03192 0.01537
[0.06241] [0.05523] [0.04400] [0.04465]
Previous public office*(1-Win) 0.0271 0.00535 -0.00656 -0.02861
[0.09011] [0.09849] [0.06727] [0.06795]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.00736 -0.00659 -0.00755 -0.00708
[0.00351]** [0.00345]* [0.00288]** [0.00278]**
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00001 0.00051 0.00033 0.00054
[0.00247] [0.00237] [0.00134] [0.00122]
Military*(1-Win) -0.02747 -0.04003 -0.00022 -0.01112
[0.06738] [0.06389] [0.04710] [0.04447]
Farmer*(1-Win) 0.06941 0.08244 -0.07103 -0.06207
[0.32986] [0.32392] [0.13973] [0.13991]
Lawyer*(1-Win) -0.04137 -0.03353 -0.0623 -0.05129
[0.27508] [0.26778] [0.09118] [0.09285]
Business*(1-Win) 0.01067 -0.01011 -0.05102 -0.04707
[0.29249] [0.28394] [0.10052] [0.10104]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.16462 -0.13851
[0.10055] [0.08176]*
Constant 0.14329 0.45458 0.51145 0.09158 0.43502 0.46619
[0.08332]* [0.36102] [0.34155] [0.05078]* [0.16343]** [0.15742]***
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
R-squared 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69
F statistic 171.72 332.5 69.61 2996.79 5397.38 6170.15
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 7: IV-RD First Stage
Dependent Variable: Longterm(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5% 5% 5%
Longterm 0.04866 0.05235 0.04645 0.04214 0.04024 0.03086
[0.02120]** [0.02297]** [0.02484]* [0.01220]*** [0.01252]*** [0.01781]*
Female 0.02772 -0.0514 0.0181 -0.03367
[0.04288] [0.07404] [0.02115] [0.04819]
College degree 0.0608 0.04973 0.03954 0.03352
[0.01870]*** [0.01763]*** [0.01450]*** [0.01390]**
Outsider 0.01845 0.01741 -0.00996 -0.01255
[0.02417] [0.02396] [0.01694] [0.01533]
Previous public office 0.01996 0.00238 -0.01095 -0.01046
[0.01986] [0.02126] [0.01936] [0.02055]
Age at entry -0.00089 -0.00074 -0.00053 -0.0006
[0.00130] [0.00122] [0.00088] [0.00090]
Age at death 0.0003 0.00029 0.00013 -0.00015
[0.00103] [0.00100] [0.00069] [0.00077]
Military 0.00157 -0.016 0.01881 0.00958
[0.02297] [0.02584] [0.01594] [0.01508]
Farmer 0.02417 0.04953 -0.01533 -0.0154
[0.04588] [0.04894] [0.03819] [0.03894]
Lawyer 0.0687 0.0725 0.00206 0.00124
[0.03875]* [0.03831]* [0.02962] [0.03051]
Business 0.10496 0.10257 0.01457 0.00613
[0.04554]** [0.04499]** [0.02894] [0.03034]
Prerelative 0.13129 0.16203
[0.07202]* [0.05041]***
Constant 0.0072 -0.11938 -0.08128 0.00228 -0.00489 0.04613
[0.04453] [0.05730]** [0.07374] [0.02385] [0.05694] [0.06501]
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 8: IV-RD Second Stage



















Win 0.91952 2.46301 2.09578 13.5333 2.14543 14.57344 1.55957 8.60396 0.88745 -8.7073 0.99698 -5.46495
[0.37192]** [3.29757] [1.56576] [16.14467] [1.39629] [15.28721] [0.51354]*** [8.12704] [1.39486] [20.07919] [1.39669] [19.94512]
Female*(1-Win) -0.85346 -2.47058 -0.18697 -0.26698 0.25157 18.29888 0.65911 17.69107
[1.63394] [18.17377] [1.17766] [14.40721] [1.04577] [15.19806] [0.65042] [9.97511]*
College degree*(1-Win) -0.62977 -6.17468 -0.62398 -6.04478 -0.36366 -5.81533 -0.3064 -4.85652
[0.37345]* [3.97209] [0.35523]* [3.72070] [0.22388] [3.05807]* [0.21969] [2.93595]
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.19076 3.98504 0.11378 2.75672 0.45536 5.24759 0.38827 4.5581
[0.47036] [4.76448] [0.42911] [4.33027] [0.36312] [4.61614] [0.32137] [4.05981]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.15446 -3.50687 -0.1689 -3.53089 -0.22921 -3.546 -0.33236 -4.56012
[0.63461] [9.48908] [0.59487] [8.66078] [0.52572] [7.27936] [0.47787] [6.60084]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.01071 -0.23684 -0.0079 -0.21231 0.00047 0.10852 0.00072 0.09938
[0.04168] [0.49932] [0.03870] [0.46495] [0.02773] [0.42919] [0.02567] [0.40092]
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00748 0.16224 0.0062 0.14196 -0.00734 -0.22054 -0.00529 -0.17494
[0.01841] [0.24962] [0.01741] [0.22882] [0.01603] [0.29628] [0.01363] [0.25666]
Military*(1-Win) -0.38675 -8.44015 -0.30961 -7.00552 -0.36919 -4.93085 -0.40479 -5.44864
[0.39069] [5.23155] [0.37282] [4.82890] [0.34357] [4.35722] [0.32930] [4.16933]
Farmer*(1-Win) 2.31832 22.46085 2.11063 20.72462 -0.13025 -8.97806 -0.0139 -7.1373
[1.76125] [20.39928] [1.70489] [19.71728] [0.93313] [13.77190] [0.90811] [13.58363]
Lawyer*(1-Win) 1.94874 20.92147 2.05275 22.11254 0.28962 0.50258 0.32886 1.25326
[1.37282] [16.65534] [1.35515] [16.25085] [0.80417] [12.78674] [0.82947] [13.02907]
Business*(1-Win) 1.68579 19.4187 1.73311 20.06529 0.3067 2.09792 0.39328 3.33354
[1.38873] [15.50333] [1.38288] [15.43970] [0.83700] [11.89180] [0.85748] [12.09588]
Prerelative*(1-Win) 0.35082 3.75454 0.43939 6.88265
[0.38440] [4.41980] [0.39856] [4.49652]
Female -0.8899 -17.1264 -1.53744 -18.8361 -1.62782 -32.48608 -1.97315 -31.0128
[1.26464] [13.67318] [0.63574]** [7.94717]** [0.86762]* [13.61543]** [0.48382]*** [8.66274]***
College degree 0.72488 6.83562 0.70863 6.75522 0.4128 5.08273 0.37316 4.50663
[0.20222]*** [1.81987]*** [0.20445]*** [1.88637]*** [0.17086]** [2.44652]** [0.16308]** [2.25009]*
Outsider 0.04178 -0.91903 0.06283 -0.40667 -0.09626 -1.03868 -0.12783 -1.41325
[0.30117] [2.75092] [0.27336] [2.50683] [0.19387] [2.51324] [0.17940] [2.27444]
5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5%
Table 9: IV-RD First Stage



















Previous public office 0.32412 1.85593 0.31081 2.13175 0.4166 5.59844 0.40282 5.50927
[0.24994] [3.17701] [0.22773] [2.88226] [0.23680]* [3.73079] [0.21001]* [3.31148]
Age at entry -0.04134 -0.40763 -0.04045 -0.39362 -0.07056 -0.97713 -0.06659 -0.91794
[0.02665] [0.30756] [0.02473] [0.28638] [0.01542]*** [0.29048]*** [0.01410]*** [0.26915]***
Age at death 0.02064 0.25298 0.02022 0.24051 0.03914 0.66051 0.03602 0.59596
[0.00998]** [0.11881]** [0.00964]** [0.11478]** [0.01162]*** [0.25427]** [0.01032]*** [0.22442]**
Military 0.18733 4.06673 0.11984 3.06974 0.32076 4.19063 0.33917 4.68407
[0.24334] [3.07953] [0.23488] [2.88691] [0.24411] [3.29040] [0.23506] [3.12650]
Farmer -2.09107 -21.57529 -1.83526 -19.51768 -0.25056 3.26882 -0.28007 2.37507
[1.63213] [20.35181] [1.62287] [20.05031] [0.75909] [12.46443] [0.72241] [12.15183]
Lawyer -1.91417 -19.80559 -1.9923 -20.76657 -0.52406 -2.6361 -0.52518 -3.08716
[1.27856] [16.81483] [1.29756] [16.75531] [0.71841] [12.29849] [0.72058] [12.26489]
Business -1.64618 -18.55955 -1.70171 -19.05244 -0.63366 -6.31587 -0.63442 -6.52715
[1.25950] [16.06092] [1.27524] [16.04406] [0.64879] [10.81173] [0.64749] [10.78996]
Prerelative -1.04683 -9.99006 -0.83141 -9.74565
[0.25083]*** [2.55438]*** [0.24496]*** [3.53353]***
Constant 1.3957 4.20446 1.4961 4.59122 1.59236 5.02575 1.44662 7.31738 2.3512 16.20704 2.30761 15.10713
[0.31205]*** [3.15680] [1.05083] [9.03070] [1.00779] [8.96907] [0.37006]*** [5.53817] [0.80260]*** [10.17198] [0.77121]*** [9.75853]
Region  YYYYYYYYYYYY
Decade YYYYYYYYYYYY
Includes Members with Previous 
Relatives 
NNNNYYNNNNYY
Observations 518 518 506 506 551 551 1065 1065 1047 1047 1127 1127
R-squared 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.23 0.3 0.22 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.14
F statistic 50.59 22.54 63.1 69.11 87.52 82.23 81.45 63.19 107.92 41.79 148.86 23.93
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5%
Table 9 Continued: IV-RD First Stage(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5% 5% 5%
Total tenure 0.04389 0.04008 0.04649 0.06265 0.03874 0.04362
[0.02056]** [0.01670]** [0.01724]*** [0.02024]*** [0.01634]** [0.02629]
Total tenure^2 -0.00412 -0.00317 -0.00457 -0.00677 -0.00363 -0.0049
[0.00301] [0.00183]* [0.00199]** [0.00281]** [0.00207]* [0.00346]
Female 0.02296 -0.07036 -0.00584 -0.07419
[0.04431] [0.08466] [0.03148] [0.06235]
College degree 0.05733 0.04972 0.03995 0.03586
[0.01884]*** [0.01838]*** [0.01574]** [0.01550]**
Outsider 0.01515 0.01417 -0.00893 -0.0113
[0.02406] [0.02365] [0.01731] [0.01549]
Previous public office 0.01238 -0.00395 -0.0081 -0.00387
[0.01938] [0.02151] [0.01974] [0.02074]
Age at entry -0.00091 -0.00115 -0.00134 -0.00214
[0.00137] [0.00135] [0.00111] [0.00137]
Age at death 0.0004 0.00067 0.00079 0.00094
[0.00109] [0.00102] [0.00074] [0.00089]
Military 0.00023 -0.01702 0.02081 0.01502
[0.02132] [0.02411] [0.01631] [0.01629]
Farmer 0.02856 0.04378 -0.00764 -0.00691
[0.04984] [0.05355] [0.03467] [0.03568]
Lawyer 0.07741 0.07252 0.00728 0.0049
[0.04232]* [0.04210]* [0.03106] [0.03544]
Business 0.11033 0.10067 0.01313 0.00111
[0.04282]** [0.04473]** [0.02985] [0.03441]
Prerelative 0.12829 0.1552
[0.07201]* [0.04828]***
Constant -0.02254 -0.14825 -0.11686 -0.03573 -0.04263 0.00393
[0.04935] [0.06506]** [0.08224] [0.03402] [0.05987] [0.07102]
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
TE(2-1) 0.03153 0.03057 0.03278 0.04234 0.02785 0.02892
TE(2-1) p-value 0.0196 0.0166 0.0136 0.0014 0.0117 0.0844
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 10: IV-RD Second Stage
Dependent Variable: Prerelative(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Win 0.79903 0.61653 0.61233 0.61633 0.81931 0.63553
[0.05702]*** [0.12186]*** [0.11532]*** [0.11800]*** [0.04735]*** [0.11639]***
Female*(1-Win) -0.02087 -0.01643 0.02805 -0.02881
[0.15393] [0.15376] [0.15530] [0.15354]
College degree*(1-Win) 0.04484 0.04312 0.02182 0.04749
[0.02479]* [0.02435]* [0.03032] [0.02213]**
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.0039 -0.00692 0.01159 -0.00573
[0.02535] [0.02501] [0.03176] [0.02557]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.00114 -0.01717 -0.02243 0.0019
[0.03426] [0.03270] [0.03318] [0.03380]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.007 -0.00619 -0.00652 -0.00673
[0.00188]*** [0.00184]*** [0.00184]*** [0.00178]***
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00181 0.00168 0.00211 0.00187
[0.00108] [0.00102] [0.00099]** [0.00113]
Military*(1-Win) -0.01028 -0.01155 -0.02141 -0.01219
[0.02851] [0.02789] [0.02620] [0.02569]
Farmer*(1-Win) -0.02759 -0.00965 -0.04892 -0.05809
[0.07866] [0.07747] [0.08458] [0.07530]
Lawyer*(1-Win) -0.03565 -0.03083 -0.04182 -0.05588
[0.05404] [0.05226] [0.04743] [0.05357]
Business*(1-Win) -0.00991 -0.0082 -0.01791 -0.01894
[0.06924] [0.06660] [0.06536] [0.07036]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.06206
[0.04538]
Constant 0.20097 0.38347 0.38767 0.38367 0.18069 0.36447
[0.05702]*** [0.12186]*** [0.11532]*** [0.11800]*** [0.04735]*** [0.11639]***
Region  YYYNYY
Decade Y Y Y N Y Y
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNN
State N N N Y N N
Year N N N Y N N
Observations 3095 3034 3295 3034 3605 3537
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.78
F statistic 2134.44 9427.11 17234.85 11678.95 2790 10522.46
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 11: IV First Stage
Dependent Variable: LongtermDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Longterm 0.06428 0.06244 0.05028 0.05425 0.04669 0.05154 0.04661
[0.02092]*** [0.02144]*** [0.02590]* [0.02378]** [0.01572]*** [0.02179]** [0.02025]**
Female 0.05354 0.0244 0.02568 0.04652 0.04601
[0.06678] [0.06347] [0.06390] [0.06903] [0.05927]
College degree 0.01261 0.01251 0.01247 0.00974 0.01086
[0.00895] [0.01013] [0.01008] [0.00862] [0.00862]
Outsider -0.00002 -0.00051 -0.00054 0.00284 0.00104
[0.00776] [0.00823] [0.00824] [0.00698] [0.00649]
Previous public office 0.00405 0.00513 0.00509 -0.00139 0.00002
[0.00798] [0.00838] [0.00837] [0.00868] [0.00826]
Age at entry 0.00035 0.00017 0.00016 0.00035 0.0001
[0.00044] [0.00048] [0.00049] [0.00046] [0.00038]
Age at death -0.00007 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00026
[0.00039] [0.00042] [0.00042] [0.00035] [0.00037]
Military 0.00124 -0.00874 -0.00891 -0.00129 -0.00028
[0.00914] [0.00942] [0.00939] [0.00864] [0.00806]
Farmer -0.01667 -0.01936 -0.01872 -0.01809 -0.01933
[0.02462] [0.02303] [0.02313] [0.02549] [0.02122]
Lawyer 0.00569 0.00172 0.0015 0.00915 0.00683
[0.01686] [0.01711] [0.01722] [0.01649] [0.01386]
Business 0.00656 -0.00028 -0.00025 0.00964 0.00809





Constant 0.00378 -0.02199 -0.00047 -0.00301 -0.05288 0.01557 0.02078
[0.01795] [0.03033] [0.04052] [0.04026] [0.03321] [0.01973] [0.03417]
Region  YYYYNYY
Decade YYYYNYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNNN
State N N N Y Y N N
Year N N N Y Y N N
Observations 3095 3034 3295 3295 3034 3605 3537
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%



















Win 1.12002 3.33391 1.04425 -2.88729 1.19229 0.0549 0.51033 -8.20437 0.94211 -0.88898 0.4789 -10.64449
[0.30023]*** [3.18625] [1.06768] [15.42783] [1.00530] [14.53174] [1.27449] [18.03092] [0.32513]*** [4.58743] [0.90433] [12.12421]
Female*(1-Win) 0.92848 19.5052 1.40967 22.91289 -0.91441 -8.47021 0.66582 13.88848
[0.75933] [10.14804]* [0.69656]** [8.42555]*** [1.04060] [14.02170] [0.71404] [9.28755]
College degree*(1-Win) 0.10332 0.21104 0.13719 1.03087 -0.55806 -7.90334 0.04939 -0.23922
[0.13182] [1.94227] [0.12502] [1.93594] [0.18957]*** [2.68442]*** [0.10712] [1.55552]
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.04393 1.19729 0.00174 0.71249 0.12279 1.66126 -0.09507 -0.75447
[0.19837] [2.99195] [0.18422] [2.80373] [0.18463] [2.39974] [0.19408] [2.73228]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.35738 -5.45879 -0.4624 -6.42205 -0.46656 -6.46503 -0.32983 -4.77777
[0.23893] [3.26835] [0.22754]** [3.03956]** [0.23406]* [3.05024]** [0.23424] [3.07280]
Age at entry*(1-Win) 0.03657 0.79053 0.04194 0.85544 0.01781 0.56789 0.04507 0.91587
[0.01281]*** [0.21829]*** [0.01220]*** [0.21590]*** [0.01266] [0.21160]*** [0.01188]*** [0.20507]***
Age at death*(1-Win) -0.03231 -0.68966 -0.03136 -0.66385 -0.04145 -0.81812 -0.0396 -0.77991
[0.00865]*** [0.14965]*** [0.00828]*** [0.14680]*** [0.00912]*** [0.15976]*** [0.00789]*** [0.13937]***
Military*(1-Win) -0.0896 -1.38218 -0.0914 -1.15266 -0.19128 -2.21984 -0.03411 -0.62992
[0.18837] [3.27875] [0.18125] [3.12115] [0.21971] [3.36035] [0.17054] [2.91888]
Farmer*(1-Win) 1.28372 17.01584 1.39736 17.68231 1.78375 24.15491 1.19345 16.76935
[0.58780]** [9.83604]* [0.55086]** [9.33838]* [0.64861]*** [10.51682]** [0.57410]** [9.08138]*
Lawyer*(1-Win) 0.7956 11.4737 0.86948 11.9149 1.64754 22.87222 0.60765 9.54785
[0.47761] [9.00211] [0.46468]* [8.73447] [0.53926]*** [9.81558]** [0.48160] [8.23452]
Business*(1-Win) 0.84773 11.12923 0.95854 12.43353 1.47012 19.28411 0.70488 9.88851
[0.48871]* [9.13164] [0.47324]** [8.83351] [0.54948]** [9.76624]* [0.49519] [8.24582]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.09516 -0.77686
[0.30175] [4.52873]
Female -1.35529 -24.40739 -1.80573 -27.51341 -0.01088 -7.05415 -1.1617 -19.50442
[0.69797]* [9.97567]** [0.59275]*** [8.25808]*** [0.90207] [11.28379] [0.67219]* [9.21990]**
College degree 0.05566 0.86696 0.03237 0.18584 0.6019 7.78092 0.14139 1.61836
[0.11182] [1.86618] [0.10772] [1.88530] [0.13589]*** [2.29553]*** [0.09850] [1.57842]
Outsider -0.01284 -0.92412 -0.01586 -0.84388 -0.1612 -2.48309 0.11924 1.12285
[0.12755] [2.44334] [0.12365] [2.31839] [0.12134] [1.97521] [0.12057] [2.16540]
40% 40% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 13: IV-RD First Stage



















Previous public office 0.46234 6.82349 0.4998 7.30712 0.40571 5.84932 0.42784 6.04679
[0.11253]*** [1.50055]*** [0.10854]*** [1.43852]*** [0.14264]*** [1.78927]*** [0.11459]*** [1.63251]***
Age at entry -0.0825 -1.33253 -0.08388 -1.35478 -0.0628 -1.09115 -0.08828 -1.42257
[0.00805]*** [0.16998]*** [0.00829]*** [0.17506]*** [0.00798]*** [0.16226]*** [0.00753]*** [0.15876]***
Age at death 0.05473 0.97525 0.05229 0.93218 0.0665 1.12853 0.06036 1.04288
[0.00793]*** [0.15184]*** [0.00785]*** [0.15047]*** [0.00825]*** [0.16129]*** [0.00701]*** [0.13977]***
Military 0.07414 1.61234 0.06902 1.30025 0.16762 2.88342 0.04199 1.144
[0.11777] [2.52643] [0.11365] [2.35266] [0.13830] [2.30482] [0.09730] [2.13886]
Farmer -1.18179 -16.2942 -1.23419 -16.57487 -1.72143 -23.70934 -1.21722 -16.93752
[0.46817]** [8.94043]* [0.44454]*** [8.54781]* [0.48422]*** [9.12760]** [0.42558]*** [8.00515]**
Lawyer -0.75476 -10.48146 -0.82566 -10.96774 -1.56607 -21.25185 -0.68838 -9.65186
[0.41298]* [8.39051] [0.40086]** [8.11800] [0.45133]*** [8.83872]** [0.36447]* [7.35326]
Business -0.68735 -9.06667 -0.77162 -10.08823 -1.27576 -16.94754 -0.66748 -9.07383
[0.41163] [8.38764] [0.39750]* [8.09490] [0.43788]*** [8.84076]* [0.36932]* [7.21795]
Prerelative -0.11535 -1.15917
[0.21605] [3.99911]
Constant 1.5023 5.1262 1.76935 6.85696 1.72701 6.1971 1.73492 4.9365 1.51652 6.4568 1.87354 8.99958
[0.23154]*** [2.35501]** [0.45416]*** [4.84678] [0.40923]*** [4.43035] [0.65027]** [7.69299] [0.23795]*** [2.91926]** [0.46880]*** [4.80306]*
Region  YYYYYYNNYYYY
Decade YYYYYYNNYYYY
Margin of Votes quartic YYYYYYYYYYYY





Observations 3095 3095 3034 3034 3295 3295 3034 3034 3605 3605 3537 3537
R-squared 0.24 0.11 0.3 0.17 0.3 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.19
F statistic 26.66 13.57 37.6 24.99 49.04 25.3 250000 11571.8 37.51 34.66 54.55 42.93
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
40% 40% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 13 Continued: IV-RD First StageDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Total tenure 0.04981 0.0334 0.02905 0.0303 0.02428 0.03942 0.02231
[0.01673]*** [0.01372]** [0.01688]* [0.01560]* [0.01166]** [0.01692]** [0.01157]*
Total tenure^2 -0.00414 -0.00224 -0.00217 -0.00229 -0.00182 -0.00376 -0.00194
[0.00149]*** [0.00111]** [0.00143] [0.00134]* [0.00092]* [0.00147]** [0.00087]**
Female 0.04914 0.01999 0.02061 0.03946 0.03743
[0.06253] [0.05911] [0.05887] [0.06644] [0.05502]
College degree 0.01258 0.01203 0.01211 0.0096 0.01104
[0.00914] [0.01049] [0.01051] [0.00881] [0.00868]
Outsider -0.00126 -0.00165 -0.00191 0.00312 0.00053
[0.00812] [0.00832] [0.00813] [0.00729] [0.00687]
Previous public office 0.00368 0.00603 0.00584 -0.0015 0.00145
[0.00779] [0.00870] [0.00897] [0.00874] [0.00799]
Age at entry 0.00018 -0.00022 -0.00028 0.00007 -0.00055
[0.00068] [0.00069] [0.00069] [0.00058] [0.00067]
Age at death 0.00017 0.00038 0.00043 0.00026 0.00026
[0.00049] [0.00049] [0.00050] [0.00043] [0.00050]
Military 0.0023 -0.00786 -0.00803 -0.00089 0.00095
[0.00874] [0.00901] [0.00903] [0.00858] [0.00769]
Farmer -0.01674 -0.0209 -0.02073 -0.01979 -0.02404
[0.02569] [0.02452] [0.02481] [0.02684] [0.02229]
Lawyer 0.00624 0.0015 0.00102 0.00868 0.00457
[0.01785] [0.01824] [0.01842] [0.01699] [0.01573]
Business 0.00755 -0.00033 0.00001 0.00802 0.00627







Constant -0.03229 -0.04693 -0.02364 -0.02628 -0.06578 -0.01285 0.00786
[0.02825] [0.03545] [0.04562] [0.04439] [0.03958] [0.03282] [0.03823]
Region  YYYYNYY
Decade YYYYNYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYY





TE(2-1) 0.03739 0.02668 0.02254 0.02343 0.01882 0.02814 0.01649
TE(2-1) p-value 0.0046 0.0173 0.0881 0.0557 0.0484 0.0331 0.086
Observations 3095 3034 3295 3295 3034 3605 3537
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 14: IV-RD Second StageDependent Variable: Longterm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Re-Election Instrument 0.37946 0.3351 0.33607 0.3315 0.33372
[.02054]*** [.02198]*** [.023]*** [.02236]*** [.02326]***
Constant 0.54733 0.49868 0.49785 0.50138 0.49971
[.11524]*** [.22981]*** [.22912]** [.23029]** [.22964]**
State/Quarter Interaction Y NNNN
State/Decade Interaction N YYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYNYN
Relatives Only Enter 10 
Years or More Later
NNNYY
Observations 7359 7359 6734 7182 6639
F-Stat 179 90 98 88 95
R-Squared 0.127 0.161 0.173 0.16 0.172
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 15: IV First Stage for External Shocks Instrumental Variables ApproachDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Longterm 0.05863 0.07286 0.03923 0.05779 0.04374
[.02618]** [.03319]** [.02874] [.02734]** [.02393]*
Constant 0.26487 0.19535 0.22058 0.20666 0.21272
[.02128]*** [.02489]*** [.02156]*** [.02051]*** [.01795]***
State/Quarter Interaction Y NNNN
State/Decade Interaction N YYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYNYN
Relatives Only Enter 10 
Years or More Later
NNNYY
Observations 7359 7359 6734 7182 6639
R-Squared 0.091 0.121 0.242 0.111 0.112
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Table 16: IV Second Stage for External Shocks Instrumental Variables Approach(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Competition 0.1851 .1986
[.074]** [.0747]***
Political Competition ^ 2 .535 .5464
[.1639]*** [.1667]***
20th-40th Percentile of Political Competition -.0181 -.0179
[.0174] [.0186]
40th-60th Percentile of Political Competition -.0378 -.0383
[.016]** [.017]**
60th-80th Percentile of Political Competition -.0351 -.0347
[.0167]** [.0176]*




Excluding first 30 years of statehood N Y N Y
Observations 6417 6139 6374 6096
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
 *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Prerelative
Table 17: The Impact of Political CompetitionRelationship Count Percent Cumulative
Parent 267 16.29 16.29
Child 398 24.28 40.57
Grandparent 45 2.75 43.32
Grandchild 81 4.94 48.26
Uncle / Aunt 101 6.16 54.42
Nephew / Nice 149 9.09 63.51
Brother / Sister 293 17.88 81.39
Cousin 148 9.03 90.42
Husband 34 2.07 92.5
Wife or Widow 32 1.95 94.45
Other 90 5.55 100
Total 1,639 100
Table A1: Sample of the major types of family relationshipsVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Previous relative in office 11455 0.087 0.28 0 1
Posterior relative in office 11455 0.085 0.28 0 1
Long term 11455 0.651 0.48 0 1
Total tenure 11455 3.73 3.54 1 29
Age at death 10205 69.98 12.78 27 103
Age at entry 11455 43.87 9.25 21 86
Previous public office 11455 0.806 0.40 0 1
College degree 11455 0.651 0.48 0 1
Female 11455 0.015 0.12 0 1
Outsider to state 11455 0.392 0.49 0 1
House (vs. Senate) 11455 0.891 0.31 0 1
Military 11455 0.356 0.48 0 1
Lawyer 10950 0.594 0.49 0 1
Farmer 10950 0.072 0.26 0 1








Adams 1803 1862 16 3 John Quincy Adams
Aldrich 1876 Present 32 5 Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich
Breckinridge 1789 1978 72 17 Henry Clay
Bryan 1895 1976 15 3 William Jennings Bryan
Burr 1791 1806 4 2 Aaron Burr
Bush 1951 1970 8 2 George H.W. Bush
Du Pont 1905 1928 9 2 Henry Algernon Du Pont
Frelinghuysen 1793 Present 25 6
Gore 1939 1992 24 2 Albert Arnold Gore Jr.
Harrison 1793 1968 24 8 William Henry Harrison
Hearst 1885 1906 5 2 William Randolph Hearst
Hiester 1789 1880 38 12
Houston 1823 1942 12 3 Samuel Houston
Kennedy 1895 Present 37 6 John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lodge 1887 1952 37 4 Henry Cabot Lodge
Monroe 1789 1840 4 2 James Monroe
Morris 1789 1802 4 2 Robert Morris
Pelosi 1939 Present 10 2 Nancy Pelosi
Roosevelt 1949 1966 9 2 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr.
Note: Sometimes the family names are not consistent within families. For example Henry 
Clay came from a family where the predominant last name was Breckinridge. For ease of 
exposition we chose the modal last name.
Table A3: Notable Families in CongressWindow size - margin of votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2.5% 5% 10% 25% 40% 55% 70% 85% 98%
Postrelative 0.07995 0.05133 0.04352 0.06279 0.0457 0.0427 0.03628 0.03685 0.03021
[0.06499] [0.04153] [0.02601] [0.02182]*** [0.02035]** [0.01547]*** [0.01535]** [0.01483]** [0.01174]**
Lawyer 0.00245 0.01926 0.02399 0.01315 0.01886 0.01518 0.01439 0.0171 0.0183
[0.02687] [0.03013] [0.01878] [0.01514] [0.01543] [0.01445] [0.01404] [0.01328] [0.01241]
Previous public office -0.13921 -0.16214 -0.15942 -0.0751 -0.06215 -0.03797 -0.02758 -0.03022 -0.02964
[0.08105]* [0.05324]*** [0.06247]** [0.03887]* [0.02976]** [0.02871] [0.02522] [0.02434] [0.02659]
Female 0.00439 0.01287 0.00077 0.0026 0.00599 0.00316 0.00205 0.0014 -0.00005
[0.01732] [0.01422] [0.01084] [0.00745] [0.00647] [0.00520] [0.00466] [0.00446] [0.00396]
Outsider 0.07295 0.10164 0.01957 -0.05671 -0.0451 -0.07267 -0.05589 -0.07351 -0.0638
[0.12040] [0.08714] [0.08995] [0.05570] [0.05083] [0.04571] [0.04135] [0.04027]* [0.03769]*
Age at entry -0.20201 0.60739 0.16625 0.47087 0.21818 0.05975 0.04388 -0.04264 -0.29942
[1.71396] [1.02209] [0.76202] [0.56419] [0.57378] [0.54186] [0.56528] [0.47285] [0.45359]
College graduate -0.2218 -0.07546 -0.11612 -0.01058 0.01645 0.04328 0.04063 0.01915 0.01328
[0.10237]** [0.08851] [0.07317] [0.04784] [0.03805] [0.03221] [0.03113] [0.03181] [0.02785]
Military -0.03016 -0.00517 0.00164 0.03332 0.0474 0.03963 0.03769 0.02438 0.03712
[0.13702] [0.08989] [0.06760] [0.03698] [0.03527] [0.03697] [0.03586] [0.03454] [0.03381]
Farmer -0.00246 -0.01365 -0.00221 -0.00318 0.00053 0.00197 -0.00248 0.00244 0.0059
[0.03015] [0.02571] [0.02089] [0.01581] [0.01481] [0.01182] [0.01163] [0.01089] [0.01075]
Business -0.03016 -0.00517 0.00164 0.03332 0.0474 0.03963 0.03769 0.02438 0.03712
[0.13702] [0.08989] [0.06760] [0.03698] [0.03527] [0.03697] [0.03586] [0.03454] [0.03381]
Region YYYYYYYYY
Decade YYYYYYYYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYYYY
Observations 505 1048 1807 3042 3545 3774 3885 3928 4041
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A4: IV-RD Estimates for Longterm on Each Observable at the Region Decade LevelWindow size - margin of votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2.50% 5% 10% 25% 40% 55% 70% 85% 98%
Postrelative 0.05895 0.02305 0.02925 0.04684 0.02796 0.02747 0.02139 0.02416 0.01735
[0.05952] [0.03960] [0.02431] [0.01579]*** [0.01614]* [0.01457]* [0.01481] [0.01389]* [0.01021]*
Lawyer 0.0021 0.00888 0.01533 0.01709 0.0136 0.01341 0.0137 0.01649 0.01676
[0.01302] [0.01971] [0.01898] [0.01613] [0.01784] [0.01506] [0.01352] [0.01269] [0.01229]
Previous public office -0.13623 -0.07336 -0.10989 -0.03618 -0.03126 -0.02261 -0.00967 -0.01507 -0.01642
[0.09432] [0.05633] [0.05188]** [0.03318] [0.02812] [0.02865] [0.02636] [0.02691] [0.02720]
Female -0.00119 0.00843 -0.00038 0.00084 0.00409 0.00316 0.00227 0.00176 0.00076
[0.01529] [0.01236] [0.01095] [0.00863] [0.00690] [0.00526] [0.00474] [0.00443] [0.00400]
Outsider 0.03347 0.1192 0.05337 -0.03462 -0.03067 -0.05222 -0.04546 -0.0574 -0.04878
[0.08564] [0.07269] [0.06739] [0.05070] [0.04428] [0.04054] [0.03716] [0.03658] [0.03323]
Age at entry -3.30137 -0.44272 -2.14305 -0.46352 -0.29597 -0.22054 -0.15511 -0.42819 -0.57877
[2.62545] [1.34836] [0.78641]*** [0.71851] [0.64041] [0.57228] [0.57079] [0.51280] [0.45808]
College graduate -0.0191 -0.01422 -0.10707 0.00469 0.02973 0.04302 0.04186 0.02328 0.0182
[0.06165] [0.07095] [0.06387] [0.04383] [0.03551] [0.02980] [0.03022] [0.03260] [0.02945]
Military -0.05183 0.02975 0.01847 0.02917 0.04457 0.04296 0.04343 0.03399 0.04612
[0.12290] [0.07440] [0.06208] [0.03900] [0.03254] [0.03376] [0.03043] [0.02919] [0.02908]
Farmer 0.00704 -0.02115 -0.00584 0.00457 -0.00056 0.00233 -0.00244 0.00304 0.00525
[0.02071] [0.01705] [0.02195] [0.01683] [0.01610] [0.01243] [0.01158] [0.01091] [0.01129]
Business -0.01106 -0.01179 0.00338 0.0069 0.00646 0.00443 0.0067 0.00879 0.00907
[0.01188] [0.01923] [0.01852] [0.01707] [0.01748] [0.01396] [0.01235] [0.01122] [0.01056]
State YYYYYYYYY
Year YYYYYYYYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYYYY
Observations 505 1048 1807 3042 3545 3774 3885 3928 4041
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A5: IV-RD Estimates for Longterm on Each Observable at the State Year LevelFigure 1: Trends in Congressmen with Relatives
A: Proportion of Legislators with Relatives B: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives
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Figure 2: Trends in Congressmen with Previous Relatives
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Total Tenure
Figure 3: Impact of Total Tenure on the Probability a 
Legislator has a Posterior Relative
Note: Figure 3B gives the predicted values from specification 10 in Table 5. Values of 10 or greater are replaced 
with > 10. This is done given the small number of observations greater than 10.









































Figure 4: The Discontinuous Impact of Victory on Having 
Posterior Relatives
Note: Quartic polynomial used for interpolation.Figure 5: The Impact of the Vote Margin in First Reelection on 
Long Term and Total Tenure




































A: Long Term B: Total TenureFigure 6: Impact of Political Competition on Predicted
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